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F.Y. Edgeworth’s Mathematical Psychics and his Utilitarianism: 








The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that Edgeworth’s Mathematical Psychics (1881) 
has been influenced by various intellectual contemporaries through the ‘Sidgwick-Barratt 
Controversy’. Under the influence of Barratt, Edgeworth admitted the physical methods of ethics; 
which is clear from his adoption of the ‘Fechner’s Law’ to measure the quantity of pleasure. 
Through the analysis of the contract between egoistic agents, Edgeworth also attempted to prove 
the need of utilitarianism as the solution to Sicgwick’s ‘Dualism of Practical Reasons’. Since 
Edgeworth asserted that the capacity for pleasure is different among people, criticizing ‘equality’ 
tacitly implied in utilitarianism, he admitted ‘exact Utilitarianism’ which allowed unequal 
distribution as the ‘distributive justice’ for the greatest happiness of the society. Thus Edgeworth’s 
Mathematical Psychics is not only the economic but also ethical work influenced by 
‘Sidgwick-Barratt Controversy’. 
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I. Introduction 
Francis Ysidro Edgeworth (1845-1926) published a book entitled Mathematical 
Psychics (1881), which is well known for the ‘Box Diagram’. This work, as J.M. 
Keynes described it, was not only ‘a very eccentric book’, but also ‘the strange but 
charming amalgam of poetry and pedantry, science and art, wit and learning’ (Keynes 
1933, 258). ‘In order to place [Edgeworth] for us’, including this ‘very eccentric book’, 
Schumpeter noted as follows: ‘first[ly], I mention his utilitarianism, which strongly 
asserted itself from the beginning (New and Old Methods of Ethics, 1877) and looked so 
incongruous in a man whose mind was nothing if not “cultured”’ (Schumpeter 1954, 
830). 
  From the point of ‘Utilitarianism’, some researchers have attempted to recognize the 
existence of indeterminacy and its arbitration through Edgeworth’s contract theory in 
Mathematical Psychics; for example, by Collard (1975), Creedy (1986) and Newman 
(1987); as well as by Negishi (1985), Nakano (1995), and Matsushima (2005). 
According to Nakano, Edgeworth’s argument was ‘to justify the principle of 
utilitarianism’, and this justification has been accomplished by two arguments; first by 
‘justifying utilitarianism as the issue of choice under the indeterminacy through contract 
theory’ and secondly by ‘justifying it based on altruism’ (Nakano 1995, 176). The 
former is adopted by Creedy, Negishi and Matsushima, and the latter by Collard and 
Nakano.
1 Matsushima, for example, insists Edgeworth described the prototype of 
utilitarianism which does not identify ‘self interest’ with ‘public interest’ (Matsushima 
2005, 53), and Nakano states ‘the argument of Edgeworth was an attempt to correct the 
image of man and bring the element of altruism into utilitarianism’ (Nakano 1995, 178). 
Although these papers focused on Edgeworth’s utilitarianism, they dealt with it only in 
                                                  
1  Creedy, Negishi and Matsushima regard Edgeworth’s argument as a pioneer of 
‘neo-utilitarianism’. However, Nakano (1995) points out that ‘indeterminacy’ is used 
differently by Edgeworth and the neo-utilitarians.  -3   -
terms of economic theory or history of economic doctrine because their observations are 
limited to the first half of Part II in Mathematical Psychics, called ‘Economical 
Calculus’. For this reason, we cannot deny that they ignore Edgeworth’s utilitarianism 
shown in the latter half of the same part, dealing with ‘Utilitarian Calculus’.
2 
    According to Edgeworth, Part II of Mathematical Psychics is composed of 
‘Economical Calculus’, which ‘investigates the equilibrium of a system of hedonic 
forces each tending to maximum individual utility’, and ‘Utilitarian Calculus, the 
equilibrium of a system in which each and all tend to maximum universal utility’ 
(Edgeworth 1881, 15-16). His purpose for Part II is to suggest ‘an addition to Mr. 
Sidgwick’s “ethical methods”’, because Sidgwick’s ‘division of Hedonism – the class of 
“Method” whose principle of action may be generically defined maximizing happiness – 
is not exhaustive’ (ibid., v, 16). This purpose gives us some important suggestions for 
tracing the whole picture of his utilitarianism in Mathematical Psychics; first of all, we 
must deal with these two ‘Calculus[es]’ together, and secondly, we have to consider the 
close relationship between Edgeworth’s Mathematical Psychics and Sidgwick’s 
Methods of Ethics (1874). Undoubtedly, the connection between Edgeworth and 
Sidgwick started long before Mathematical Psychics. In fact, Edgeworth had already 
published his idea on this subject. His first book New and Old Methods of Ethics or 
“Physical Ethics” and “Methods of Ethics” (1877) was an ‘attempt to compare….the 
“Physical Ethics” of Mr. Alfred Barratt,
3 and the “Methods of Ethics” of Mr. Henry 
                                                  
2  Peart and Levy(2005) pay attention to the capacity of pleasure argued in ‘Utilitarian 
Calculus’, even though they give fewer paragraphs to and omit the relation between 
these two ‘Calculus[es]’. 
3  Alfred Barratt (1844-81) was educated at Rugby, before entering Balliol College, 
Oxford in 1862. He became a fellow of Brasenose College in 1868 and was called to the 
bar in 1872. His Physical Ethics, published in 1869, was admired as ‘a most remarkable 
performance for a youth of twenty-four, showing wide reading and marked literary 
power’ (Stephen and Lee 1917, vol.1, 1194-95).  -4   -
Sidgwick’ (Edgeworth 1877, 1).
4 About that time, Barratt and Sidgwick had a 
‘Controversy’ (ibid., ii) in Mind about the details of Methods of Ethics. In addition, 
Edgeworth’s second article entitled ‘Hedonical Calculus’ (1879) was later reprinted in 
Part II of Mathematical Psychics under the new title of ‘Utilitarian Calculus’.
5 This 
shows that Sidgwick’s Methods  of Ethics, as well as the ‘Controversy’ between 
Sidgwick and Barratt, was very important for Edgeworth before the publication of 
Mathematical Psychics. Therefore, we also need to examine this point carefully in order 
to clarify how Mathematical Psychics had been composed.
6 
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that Edgeworth’s Mathematical Psychics 
was influenced by various intellectual sources from his contemporaries through this 
Sidgwick-Barratt Controversy, which has been ignored by existing papers. For this 
purpose, in the second section, I am going to deal with the substance of the 
Sidgwick-Barratt Controversy and Edgeworth’s ideas, before dealing with 
Mathematical Psychics. In the third section, I consider how Mathematical Psychics is 
related to this controversy, and trace Edgeworth’s utilitarianism. Finally, in the fourth 
section, I will make my conclusions.   
 
II. The Sidgwick-Barratt Controversy and Edgeworth 
In this section, I summarize the Sidgwick-Barratt Controversy, which can be regarded as 
the main source of Edgeworth’s thought. Firstly, I give the outline of the ‘Controversy’, 
                                                  
4 Since  New and Old Methods of Ethics was published soon after the second edition of 
Methods of Ethics, Edgeworth referred to the first edition. However, he referred to the 
second edition in Mathematical Psychics. 
5  As Newman states, there are no essential changes between the two (Newman 1987, 
88). As to the corrections, see ‘Notes on Mathematical Psychics’ in Creedy (1986, 
135-150). 
6  Edgeworth’s first publication was the article entitled ‘Mr. Matthew Arnold on Bishop 
Butler’s Doctrine of Self-Love’ in Mind 1876. This was a review of Arnold’s 
interpretation of Butler’s self-love. Although the author signed as T. Y. Edgeworth, it is 
regarded as F.Y. Edgeworth (Edgeworth 1876, 571).  -5   -
and then deal with its influence on Edgeworth before Mathematical Psychics. 
 
1. The Methods of Ethics and ‘The “Suppression” of Egoism’   
As Sidgwick confessed in the preface to the sixth edition of the Methods of Ethics, he 
doubted the consistency between two Hedonisms, namely that ‘each man does seek his 
own Happiness” and that “each man ought to seek the general Happiness’ (Sidgwick 
1906, xvii), because we have to accept that it is right to sacrifice our own happiness for 
the good of society.   
  Prompted by this problem, he tried to analyze the three practical reasons from a 
neutral position, namely ‘Egoism’, taking this term ‘as implying the adoption of his own 
greatest happiness as the ultimate end of each individual’s action’ (ibid, 119), 
‘Intuitionalism’, which ‘regards as the practically ultimate end of moral actions 
conformity to certain rules or dictates of Duty unconditionally prescribed’ (ibid., 96), 
and ‘Utilitarianism’, which means ‘that the conduct which, under any given 
circumstances, is objectively right, is that which will produce the greatest amount of 
happiness on the whole’ (ibid., 411). Furthermore, he aimed ‘to point out their mutual 
relations and their conflictions’ (Sidgwick 1877a, 13). 
  When we simplify Sidgwick’s framework, we see that he examined the relationship 
between intuitionalism and utilitarianism, and also that between egoism and 
utilitarianism. Regarding the former relationship, there is no conflict between these two 
practical reasons, because intuition allows us to recognize that universal happiness is the 
good and it makes the universe happier. Thus he stated that intuitionalism is not only 
compatible with utilitarianism, but also gives ‘a rational basis for such a system’ (ibid., 
456). However, regarding the latter relationship, Sidgwick concluded ‘that the 
inseparable connexion between utilitarian duty and the greatest happiness of the 
individual who conforms to it, cannot be satisfactorily demonstrated on empirical  -6   -
grounds’ (ibid., 463-64), since he could not confirm the existence of a God who assures 
everyone’s interests by promoting universal happiness. Sidgwick, then, considered the 
possibility of consistency between ‘Egoism’ and ‘Utilitarianism’ from two points of 
view, of ‘Sympathy’ and ‘Religion,’ but never arrived at ‘a complete synthesis’. Thus, 
his system, which has to admit that these two practical reasons are respectively 
independent principles, is named the ‘Dualism of Practical Reasons’. 
    Sidgwick, as mentioned above, declared neutrality in the preface to the first edition of 
the Methods of Ethics. Nevertheless, due to its composition, the book was apt to be 
misunderstood as a work that affirmed utilitarianism while denying intuitionalism and 
egoism.
7  Various criticisms of the first edition of Methods of Ethics were introduced in 
the preface to the second edition, and this preface includes the following passage. 
‘Another [critic] has constructed an article on the supposition that my principal object is 
the “suppression of Egoism”: has gone to the length of a pamphlet under the impression 
(apparently) that the “main argument” of my treatise is a demonstration of 
Universalistic Hedonism’ (ibid., xi). Though the name of the writer was not made clear, 
this article was written by Barratt under the title ‘The “Suppression” of Egoism’ printed 
in Mind, vol. 2, in 1877.
8 
    In this article, Barratt criticized Sidgwick for establishing ‘Intuitional proof’ and as a 
result suppressing egoism, omitting ‘Physical proof’ and disproving ‘Introspective 
proof’ (Barratt 1877, 167). According to Barratt, Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics 
premised the existence of ‘Moral Faculty,’ which acknowledges objective good 
                                                  
7  Methods of Ethics dealt with egoism, intuitionalism and then utilitarianism in 
succession. This order gave the impression that utilitarianism was the most important 
method among these three (Okuno 1999, 26). ‘I find that more than one critic….has 
consequently supposed me to be writing as an assailant of two of the methods which I 
chiefly examine, and a defender of the third’ (Sidgwick 1977a, xi). 
8  The other authors who attacked Sidgwick were, for instance, Bain, Bradley and T.H. 
Green (Schneewind 1977, 192; Yukiyasu 1992, 196).  -7   -
intuitively, and only classified axioms or principles which ‘Reasons’ dictates through 
this ‘Faculty’. Barratt called this method ‘Intuitional proof’ and complained that it is 
only a treatise of a single method of ethics, although the work was entitled ‘Methods of 
Ethics’. 
  As Barratt published Physical Ethics (1869) and suggested the introduction of 
physical scientific method into ethics, he questioned the lack of objectivity in ‘Moral 
Faculty’ which Sidgwick premised. If ‘Moral Faculty’ has no objectivity, then the duties 
for each person intuitionally recognized must be ‘what he thinks [is] his duty’, in other 
words, they must be ‘subjective only’(ibid., 169). To know whether the duty shown by 
the moral faculty is right or not, therefore, the objective good must be indispensable. 
Barratt strengthened importance of the objective good by using the following acoustics 
analogy: ‘from hearing alone how can we know that sound means the same, that is, 
stands in the same relation, to all men?’ (ibid., 169). In acoustics, by the physical 
criterion of vibration, it is possible to distinguish sounds in a given situation. Barratt 
stated that the objective good of ‘pleasure’ plays the same role in ethics as vibration 
does in acoustics. He previously insisted, in Physical Ethics that, physical stimulus (or 
‘irritation’) can be divided into two classes: that which preserves or develops sensory 
tissue may be pleasure, and that which injures or deranges it may be pain (negative 
pleasure) (Barratt 1869, 288, 290). Stimulus of pleasure can be observed from a 
physical point of view, and, here, the objective criterion might be found. This was the 
reason that he regarded ‘pleasure’ as an objective good. While Barratt regarded this 
objective proof based on physical scientific methods as ‘Physical proof’, Sidgwick 
denied the physical scientific ethics. He printed a reply to Barratt’s article in Mind in 
1877, noting that ‘as regards the “Physical Method” of ethics, it is enough to say that 
there cannot possibly be any such “method”’ and that ‘ethical conclusions can only be 
logically reached by starting with ethical premises: how the latter are got, it was no part  -8   -
of my plan to consider’ (Sidgwick 1877b, 412). 
  After pointing out the omission of ‘Physical proof’ in the Methods of Ethics, Barratt 
observed the fact that Sidgwick had disproved the ‘Introspective proof’. In Barratt’s 
understanding, although Sidgwick admitted pleasure as the universal motive, his idea, 
which set great store on duty, had made the proof imperfect. To make this proof perfect, 
Barratt stated, Sidgwick had to ‘refute…that self-examination shows us that pleasures 
and pains are as a matter of fact the only motives to voluntary action, and act in 
proportion to their intensity’ (Barratt 1877, 173). Thus Barratt regarded the methods in 
the  Methods of Ethics critically as ‘not different “Methods of Ethics” but different 
results of the same method’ (ibid., 168). At the same time, he developed his own 
doctrine against the ‘Dualism of Practical Reasons’. 
  Barratt emphasized that pleasure must be the end of all action, and that actors 
belonging to any organization have internal and external relation to their acts. Therefore, 
all actions depend on two principles: internal and external. As he explained, the former 
is the principle for maximizing the pleasure of an individual as a unit of an organization, 
that is, ‘Egoism’. On the other hand, the external principle is simply ‘Utilitarianism’, 
which is the principle for the organization aiming to maximize universal happiness. 
Barratt admitted that practical reasons were a mixture of these two principles. However 
their relative importance is not the same. As the organizations become more advanced 
and more complicated, actors for the harmony of the organizations regard utilitarianism 
as more important than egoism. In other words, in the simplest organizations, there is 
little room for utilitarianism. Thus, he insisted that egoism was the essential nature of 
men and that utilitarianism was an acquired principle. He therefore suggested the 
motives for utilitarianism were yielded by altering one’s belief or consequences of his 
actions for rewards, punishment and so on. His conclusion was ‘the Ethical value of  -9   -
Utilitarianism of whatever kind could only be as a method of Egoism’ (ibid., 185).
9 
Sidgwick did not clearly refute this opinion. Before long, the ‘Controversy’ between 
them came to an end with the death of Barratt in 1881. 
    As mentioned above, in addition to the difference in the interpretation of ‘methods’ of 
ethics, there was a conflict between Sidgwick, who had to admit the ‘Dualism of 
Practical Reasons’, and Barratt, who insisted that utilitarianism can be reduced to the 
fundamental principles of egoism. This was the Sidgwick-Barratt Controversy to which 
Edgeworth paid great attention. 
 
2. Edgeworth before Mathematical Psychics 
Edgeworth, who had shown his extraordinary talents in classics and ethics since his 
college days,
10 dealt with the above-mentioned Sidgwick-Barratt Controversy in New 
and Old Methods of Ethics, published in 1877 (Keynes 1933, 256). In this work, he 
firstly agreed with Barratt’s opinion of introducing physical scientific methods to ethics; 
no doubt Edgeworth knew the objection to that kind of approach on the grounds that 
‘between physics and morals there is a great gulph’, but he emphasized that ‘the whole 
scope of deductive science, and especially of applied mathematics, is to deduce from 
laws about one set of phenomena propositions about phenomena quite disparate’ 
(Edgeworth 1877, 18). As Barratt connected air vibrations and sound impressions in 
                                                  
9  Barratt published ‘Ethics and Psychogony’ in Mind 1878. In this article, while 
admitting that Methods of Ethics had been a good deal altered, he insisted Sidgwick still 
excludes Psychogony from Psychology and Ethics. Barratt, in addition, took up 
Edgeworth’s New and Old Methods of Ethics in the same article, but there is no room 
here for a full explanation of it. 
10  Edgeworth entered Trinity College, Dublin in July 1861, and graduated in December 
1865. His tutor was J.K. Ingram, but during this period there is no official record for his 
study of economics in classes. He came at the top on Examination for Honors of 
Classics and of Ethics during this period (TCD MUN/V/28/2, TCD MUN/V/30/21-24). 
Then, he moved to Oxford in January 1867, and mainly studied at Balliol College. 
Keynes indicates the possibility of his studying on Political Economy through Benjamin 
Jowett, his tutor in Balliol (Keynes 1933, 255).  - 10  -
acoustics, Edgeworth concentrated on a rule which mediated between physical and 
ethical science. This rule was ‘Fechner’s Law’ in experimental psychology (or 
psychophysics),
11  which deduced intensity of sensations from intensity of stimulus.
12 
Edgeworth replaced these two intensities respectively with quantity of pleasure and 
pleasurable stimulus, and expressed a formula (or ‘a quasi-Fechnerian law’); the first 
differential on pleasurable stimulus is positive, and the second negative (ibid., 42).
13 
This formula embodies his idea that any pleasure can be measured objectively, as well 
as his solution to that kind of utilitarianism, like J.S. Mill’s, which takes into 
consideration the difference of the quality of pleasure. In short, what is thought to be the 
difference of the quality of pleasures was, in effect, the difference of the quantity of 
pleasures. Edgeworth maintained every pleasure can be measured using the same 
criterion.  
  Edgeworth then turned to the ‘Dualism of Practical Reasons’, another subject in the 
‘Controversy’. He basically accepted Sidgwick’s definition of Practical Reasons and 
                                                  
11  G.T. Fechner was a pioneer of German experimental psychology and a founder of 
psychophysics. His works, represented by his Elemente der Psychophysik (1860), 
influenced German psychologist Wundt, who set up one of the first psychological 
laboratories in the world at the University of Leipzig (Boring 1929, 272; Imada 1962, 
180-84). 
12  Fechner’s Law is expressed as () β γ log log − = y k : where the symbolsγ ,  k ,  y and 
β   denote respectively, the quantity of sensation, the just noticeable difference, the 
quantity of stimulus (intensity of stimulus), and the stimulus threshold (Boring 1929, 
278-79; Imada 1962, 186-87): while ‘k andβ are constants’ (Edgeworth 1877, 40). 
13  The formula, ‘quasi-Fechnerian law’, can be expressed as  () () β π f y f k − = : where 
the symbols π ,  k ,  f ,  y and β  respectively denote, ‘the pleasure of a sentient 
element’, ‘capacity for pleasure’, a function which the first differential is positive and 
the second is negative, the quantity of pleasure for stimulus and ‘the “threshold”, the 
lowest value of stimulus for which there is sense of pleasure at all’ : while ‘β and  k are 
co-efficients’ (Edgeworth 1877, 42) .  -1 1   -
tried to unite them with ‘Utilitarianism’ by adopting the expectation of the ‘evolution’ of 
moral sentience: ‘the egoist, then, may have the power and the motive to cultivate a 
desire for the general good, not, indeed, to the pitch of pure utilitarianism, but to a 
degree asymptotically approaching it, in the progress of evolution, in the course of 
generations’ (ibid., 33). Here, what his evolution of moral sentience meant, was the 
extension of altruistic feelings with the social development, or advance of the members 
from the lower classes to the upper classes, because he thought universal happiness 
grew among the ‘χαρίεντες (charientes)’ and ‘σπουδαϊοι (spoudaioi)’ (‘persons of 
refinement’ and ‘good, virtuous persons’) (Edgeworth 1877, 33; Newman 2003, 251). 
This idea could be accepted only as his expectation for evolution rather than the 
solution to the ‘Dualism of Practical Reasons’. The solution was redesigned with other 
tools in the later publication Mathematical Psychics, mentioned below. Thus Edgeworth, 
in New and Old Methods of Ethics, agreed with Barratt on the introduction of physical 
methods into Ethics, but on the ‘Dualism of Practical Reasons’ he arrived at a different 
conclusion from Sidgwick or Barratt. 
  As mentioned above, after New and Old Methods of Ethics, Edgeworth published 
‘Hedonical Calculus’ which was reprinted as the ‘Utilitarian Calculus’ in Part II of 
Mathematical Psychics. Soon after the contribution of this article to Mind, Edgeworth 
became acquainted with Jevons, and read his Theory of Political Economy (second 
edition, 1879) and also Marshall’s ‘The Pure Theory of Foreign Trade’ (1879) or 
Economics of Industry (1879) at Jevons’ recommendation.
14 This must have been 
essentially his first study of Economics. Indeed, for example, he owes his notion of 
utility expressed with two dimensions, ‘intensity’ and ‘time’, or his fundamental 
function of utility both to Jevons (Edgeworth 1881, 7; 20).
15  It was not until Edgeworth 
                                                  
14  See Edgeworth (1881, 34n1), Black (1962, 215) and Creedy (1986, 43). 
15  As to the relationship between utility functions of Jevons and that of Edgeworth, see  - 12  -
came under Jevons’ influence that he acquired the new tool of ‘economical approach 
grounded on marginal utility theory’, in addition to the ‘philosophical or ethical 
approach’ and the ‘psychophysical approach’ (Fukuoka 1999, 189). 
 
III. Edgeworth’s Utilitarianism in Mathematical Psychics 
This section discusses how Edgeworth’s Mathematical Psychics and the 
Sidgwick-Barratt Controversy are related. In particular, the first half is devoted to the 
explanation of his solution to the ‘Dualism of Practical Reasons’ and the second to the 
characteristics of his utilitarianism. 
 
1. The Diagram and Utilitarian arrangement 
    Edgeworth, as mentioned above, consciously gave an account of the nature of Part II 
of  Mathematical Psychics and its relation to Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics. He has 
stated in the preface that ‘the Calculus of Pleasure (Part II) may be divided into two 
species — the Economical and the Utilitarian; the principle of division suggesting an 
addition to Mr. Sidgwick’s “ethical methods”’ (Edgeworth 1881, v). In the introduction 
to Part II, he indeed regards Sidgwick’s division of Hedonism as not being exhaustive. 
Edgeworth indicates that an indefinite number of impure methods can exist between 
‘Pure Egoistic’ and ‘Pure Universalistic’. Therefore, it is possible that the moral 
structure of the actor may be ‘μικτήτις’ (miktetis, which means ‘a mixed kind’) of these 
two (Newman 2003, 161), ‘and even the Deductive Egoist might need Utilitarian 
Calculus’ (Edgeworth 1881, 16). To explain these points was the aim of ‘Economical 
Calculus’. 
  ‘Economical Calculus’ is the analysis of egoism based on mathematical methods. 
This is because Edgeworth, in the New and Old Methods of Ethics, had already agreed 
                                                                                                                                                  
Edgeworth (1881, 104-5), as well as Uemiya (2005, 127-28).  - 13  -
with Barratt in that he supported the introduction of physical scientific methods to the 
moral sciences. Such an idea is strengthened in Part I of Mathematical Psychics, which 
points out the resemblance between the mathematical and moral sciences and, 
furthermore, regards the role of energy in physics and that of pleasure in moral sciences 
as the same.
16 
  In this Calculus, the following assumptions are made: firstly that ‘every agent is 
actuated only by self-interest’ (the first principle of Economics),
17 i.e. the agents are 
egoists; secondly that ‘there is free communication throughout a normal competitive 
field’; thirdly that four conditions for the field of perfect competition are satisfied (as 
shown in Mathematical Psychics, 18-19).
18 
Based on these assumptions, Edgeworth directs his attention to two problems, namely, 
‘how far contract is indeterminate’, and if the indeterminacy exists ‘in what direction an 
escape from its evils is to be sought’ (ibid., 20). To analyze the above problems, he drew 
the ‘Diagram’ on page 28 to illustrate the contract between Robinson Crusoe and Friday. 
In this diagram, he starts the transaction between one Crusoe and one Friday. Then 
equal-natured agents (Clones of Crusoe, or of Friday) are respectively introduced one 
after the other, and the transaction between Crusoes and Fridays is supposed to hold. 
                                                  
16  The following shows that Edgeworth regards the role of Mathematics in social 
sciences as important: ‘He that will not verify his conclusions as far as possible by 
mathematics, as it were bringing the ingots of common sense to be assayed and coined 
at the mint of the sovereign science, will hardly realize the full value of what he holds, 
will want a measure of what it will be worth in however slightly altered circumstances, 
a means of conveying and making it current’ (Edgeworth 1881, 3). He also thinks highly 
of Cournot as ‘the father of mathematical Economics’ in ‘On Unnumerical 
Mathematics’, appendix I of Mathematical Psychics (ibid., 83). 
17  Therefore, the term ‘economical’ can be regarded as being the same as that of 
‘egoistic’. 
18  The four conditions are defined as (1) ‘any individual is free to recontract with any 
out of an indefinite number’ : (2) ‘any individual is free to contract (at the same time) 
with an indefinite number’: (3) ‘any individual is free to recontract with another 
independently of, without the consent being required of, any third party’: (4) ‘any 
individual is free to contract with another independently of a third party’ (Edgeworth 
1881, 18-19).  - 14  -
    The diagram leads him to believe that the contract between one agent on each side is 
apt to meet the ‘deadlock’, and that, as the number of agents is increased, the range of 
contract curve shrinks, which means that the contract gradually gains determinacy. 
Ultimately, when the number of Crusoes and Fridays becomes infinite, the contract 
comes to ‘perfect competition’ and the range of contract curve is uniquely determined. 
Though Edgeworth adopted his fundamental ideas from Jevons, his criticism of Jevons’ 
theory of exchange is evident. While Jevons held the notion of unique exchange ratio 
called ‘law of indifference’, Edgeworth asserts that without perfect competition the 
exchange ratio cannot be unique. 
  His conclusion from this is that, in the field of competition, ‘to impair, it may be 
conjectured, the reverence paid to competition; in whose results — as if worked  out 
by a play of physical forces, impersonal, impartial — economists have complacently 
acquiesced’ if there is no ‘multiety of atoms’ (ibid., 50). Insofar as the number of 
competitors is finite, the contracts are indeterminate and this must be the common case. 
Furthermore, he emphasizes that such an ‘indeterminacy’ can be found in ‘the whole 
region of in a wide sense contract’, for instance, ‘in international, in domestic politics; 
between nations, classes, sexes’ (ibid., 51). 
  To avoid ‘the evil of indeterminacy’ in every contract, Edgeworth indicates that 
‘competition requires to be supplemented by arbitration, and the basis of arbitration 
between self-interested contractors is the greatest possible sum-total utility’ (ibid., 56). 
His indication means to take ‘utilitarian arrangement’, which maximizes the utility of 
each contractor and that of the society simultaneously. The utilitarian point which this 
arrangement shows should be achieved by maximizing the sum of one’s utility and other 
utilities weighted by the ‘coefficient of effective sympathy’.
19  
                                                  
19  Though Edgeworth does not make it clear, he supposes the coefficient of effective 
sympathy ranges from 0 to 1 and differs among individuals. Regarding his utility  - 15  -
  Thus, Edgeworth reaches his original solution to the ‘Dualism of Practical Reasons’. 
Although Edgeworth himself formerly depended on the notion of evolution in New and 
Old Methods of Ethics, in Mathematical Psychics he finds a single solution with 
‘Sympathy’.
20  This is the opposite of Sidgwick who examined the consistency between 
‘Egoism’ and ‘Utilitarianism’ from the points of ‘Sympathy’ or ‘Religion’. What 
Edgeworth succeeds in doing, is uniting the two principles of ‘Practical Reasons’ by 
‘Sympathy’ led through the contract theory, which cannot be done without Economics. 
In this sense, Edgeworth’s argument can be regarded as ‘an attempt to correct the image 
of man and bring the element of altruism into utilitarianism’ (Nakano 1995, 176). At the 
same time, in opposition to Barratt, he argues that even among the egoists the method of 
utilitarianism is needed as the ‘principle of arbitration’.
21 Thus ‘the economical leads 
up to the utilitarian calculus’ (ibid., 56). 
  We should, however, carefully recognize that Edgeworth’s ‘utilitarian point’ is not a 
quantitatively equal distribution (in his words, ‘quantitative mean’). He admits this 
quantitative mean can be found in the neighborhood of ‘utilitarian point’, but they are 
not exactly the same. In general, these two are treated as the same point, but Edgeworth 
insists that this misunderstanding comes from the notion that ‘equality’ is implicitly or 
                                                                                                                                                  
function with considering this coefficient, see Edgeworth (1881, 53), Collard (1975, 
358-60), Nakano (1995, 177) and Uemiya (2005, 120). 
20  ‘It is far from the spirit of the philosophy of pleasure to depreciate the importance of 
religion; but in the present inquiry, and dealing with the lower elements of human nature, 
we should have to seek a more obvious transition, a more earthy passage, from the 
principle of self-interest to the principle, or at least the practice, of utilitarianism’ 
(Edgeworth 1881, 52-53). 
21  Matsushima points out that this statement of Edgeworth on the ‘principle of 
arbitration’ is influenced by Marshall’s Economics of Industry, especially chapter VIII 
of Book III entitled ‘Arbitration and Conciliation’(Matsushima 2005, 48). Indeed, 
Mathematical Psychics owes a lot to Economics of Industry. However, the greater 
concern for Edgeworth is to be found in the Sidgwick-Barratt Controversy since the 
publication of New and Old Methods of Ethics. Therefore Edgeworth introduced 
‘economical approach’ for the solution to the ‘Dualism of Practical Reasons’ by 
referring to Theory of Political Economy as well as Economics of Industry.  - 16  -
naturally involved in the word ‘Utilitarianism’. Near the end of ‘Economical Calculus’, 
Edgeworth indicates that ‘qualitative mean’ is indeed ‘utilitarian equity’. If we compare 
these two notions of ‘mean’ (quantitative and qualitative), the word of ‘Utilitarianism’ 
or ‘Utilitarian’ used by Edgeworth undoubtedly involves his original ideas.   
What Edgeworth means by ‘Utilitarianism’ or ‘Utilitarian’ is dealt with in the 
‘Utilitarian Calculus’, the latter section of Part II of Mathematical Psychics. 
 
2. Edgeworth’s ‘exact Utilitarianism’ 
  In the introduction of Mathematical Psychics, Edgeworth briefly summarizes the 
‘Utilitarian Calculus’ in order to prove that the ‘Greatest Happiness’ principle is the end 
of right action. In addition, this ‘Calculus’ critically deals with Sidgwick’s utilitarianism. 
To put it more concretely, Edgeworth insists ‘if sentients differ in Capacity for 
happiness — under similar circumstances some classes of sentients experiencing on 
average more pleasure (e.g. of imagination and sympathy) and less pain (e.g. of fatigue) 
than others — there is no presumption that equality of circumstances is the most 
felicific arrangement’ (ibid., vii). In this passage, he clearly states his rejection of 
‘equality’, which utilitarianism tacitly implies, is clearly declared. It is beyond doubt 
that this view comes from the suspicion which he casts on the utilitarianism of Sidgwick 
and the Benthamites. 
  Edgeworth values Bentham highly because the latter applied a quantitatively precise 
analysis to the end of action (ibid., 117). However, he showes a unique interpretation of 
Bentham’s famous phrase ‘the Greatest Happiness of the greatest number’. The parable 
Edgeworth uses demonstrates this; ‘suppose a greater illumination attainable with a 
smaller number of lamps (supplied with more material), does the criterion in this case 
give a certain sound?’ (ibid., 117-18). This statement can also be found also on page 74 
of New and Old Methods of Ethics. What he means by this is that when a certain amount  - 17  -
of ‘distribuend means’ is shared among a certain number of ‘distributees’, the total of 
happiness in the society can be the greatest even though the minority possess the greater 
part of the ‘distribuend means’. To support ‘the Greatest Happiness’ principle by such a 
distribution, it must be taken for granted that the difference of the capacity for happiness 
among the members should be presupposed. Equal distribution, then, is allowed only 
under the condition of equal capacity for happiness. 
    Sidgwick, as Edgeworth indicates, directed his attention to the difference of capacity 
for happiness in the Methods of Ethics.
22 Sidgwick’s observation on the distribution 
was, indeed, of ‘happiness’, not of ‘means of happiness’. When the difference of 
capacity is accepted, as in the case of Edgeworth, the equal distribution of happiness as 
well as means of happiness should not be admitted for the greatest happiness. Sidgwick, 
however, declared that as hedonistic calculations are all indefinite ‘the Utilitarian 
formula seems to supply no answer to this question [of distribution]’ (Sidgwick 1877, 
384). Finally, he came to accept Benthamism in the form of ‘equal distribution of 
happiness’ as follows:  ‘the principle which most Utilitarians have either tacitly or 
expressly adopted is that of equality: as given in Bentham’s formula, “everybody to 
count one, and nobody for more than one”. And this principle is obviously the simplest, 
and the only one which does not need a special justification: for, as we saw, it must be 
reasonable to treat any one man in the same way as any other, if there be no reason 
apparent for treating him differently’ (ibid., 385). Edgeworth thinks that this idea of 
Sidgwick’s is inconsistent, and attempts to make the ‘principle of the greatest happiness’ 
more precise in ‘Utilitarian Calculus’. 
    Edgeworth, first of all, gives the following four ‘definitions’ with some explanations: 
                                                  
22  As evidence for this fact, Edgeworth quotes the following sentence in Mathematical 
Psychics (Edgeworth 1881, 124): ‘equal happiness is not to be attained by equal 
distribution of objects of desire. For some require more and some less to be equally 
happy’ (Sidgwick 1877a, 256n).  - 18  -
(1) ‘Pleasure is used for “preferable feeling” in general’ (Edgeworth 1881, 56): (2) 
‘Means are the distributable proximate means of pleasure’(ibid., 57): (3) ‘An individual 
has greater capacity for happiness than another, when for the same amount whatsoever 
of means he obtains a greater amount of pleasure, and also for the same increment (to 
the same amount) whatsoever of means a greater increment of pleasure’ (ibid., 57): (4) 
‘An individual has more capacity for work than another, when for the same amount 
whatsoever of work done he incurs a less amount of fatigue, and also for the same 
increment (to the same amount) whatsoever of work done a less increment of fatigue’  
(ibid., 59). The latter two definitions deal respectively with opposite sides of value, 
namely ‘means’ and ‘work,’ or ‘pleasure’ and ‘fatigue (or pain)’. Edgeworth asserts that, 
as the reality of definition (4) is obvious, definition (3), which takes opposite signs, 
must be practical. 
    Then, Edgeworth states the ‘axiom’ that ‘Pleasure is measurable, and all pleasures are 
commensurable’ (ibid., 59). This idea was given in New and Old Methods of Ethics by 
adopting ‘Fechner’s law,’ denoted above. In Mathematical Psychics, although the 
formula is not presented again, he clearly and simply expresses the unit of pleasure: 
‘any individual experiencing a unit of pleasure-intensity during a unit of time is to 
“count for one”’ (ibid., 8). Thus, as pleasure might be quantitatively grasped, so 
naturally interpersonal comparison, or in other words cardinal comparison, of pleasure 
could be admitted for Edgeworth. 
  Under such definitions and the ‘axiom’, as the increment of pleasure may decrease 
with increase of its means, the first increment of means should be given to the most 
capable of pleasure, and the second to the next capable. In accordance with this rule of 
distribution, Edgeworth thinks, even though the ‘distribuend means’ are occupied by a 
few, due to their superior capacities for happiness, the society can enjoy the greatest 
happiness. ‘Thus, the distribution of means as between the equally capable of pleasure  - 19  -
is equality; and generally is such that the more capable of pleasure shall have more 
means and more pleasure’ (ibid., 64). Similarly, as the increment of fatigue is thought to 
increase in proportion to the increase of work, the first increment of work should be 
given to the most capable of work, and the second to the next capable. Then, Edgeworth 
insists ‘the most capable of work shall do more work–so much more work, as to suffer 
more fatigue’ (ibid., 66). 
  The problem here is how the individual capacity of happiness or work can be 
determined. Edgeworth advances that both these capacities increase with ‘evolution’. 
He already adopted the notion of this relationship between capacities and evolution 
from Spencer and Barratt in his previous work,
23 and he applies it to education in 
Mathematical Psychics as well. ‘To advance the whole population by any [evolution] 
the same degree of evolution is then desirable; but it is probably not the most desirable 
application, a given quantity of a of means of education.
24 For it is probable that the 
highest in the order of evolution who are most capable of evolution are most capable of 
education and improvement. In the general advance the most advanced should advance 
most’ (ibid., 68). 
The accompanying problem is the possibility that the capacities for happiness or 
work a posteriori expand (or shrink) with education. Edgeworth disregards this, simply 
noting ‘[it] would hardly now be maintained in face of what is known about heredity’ 
(ibid., 59). Similar opinions can be found in the same work. He notes that ‘in so far as 
endogamy should not be the rule’, for the hereditary selection, the parents’ superior 
capacities are beneficial not only for the next generation, but for all following 
                                                  
23  See Edgeworth (1877, 72; 1881, 58). As Barratt’s ‘true mentor was Herbert Spencer’ 
(Matthew and Harrison 2004, vol.4, 32l), it can be said that Edgeworth applied 
Spencerion concepts to his New and Old Methods of Ethics. As to Spencer’s influence 
on Edgeworth, see also Baccini(2007, 80-84). 
24  ‘The words, “given quantity of a of means” should read “of a given quantity of 
means”’ (Creedy 1986, 143).  - 20  -
generations. In New and Old Methods of Ethics, Edgeworth’s notion of evolution was 
the social development or the advance of the member from the lower classes to the 
upper classes. In Mathematical Psychics, this notion develops to include eugenic 
thought, which is shown by the quotation from Galton’s Hereditary Genius (1879) (ibid., 
72; Galton 1879, 415). Though some difference exists among the capacities of each 
individual in the same class, people who generally tend to inherit superior capacities 
belong to the higher classes, and these people are capable of advancement. Such was his 
notion of evolution. 
As the capacities for happiness or work differ among the different classes, ‘equality’ 
cannot be ‘distributive justice’. Rather, Edgeworth maintains that in order to achieve the 
greatest happiness ‘unequal distribution’ of means is appropriate for ‘distributive 
justice’.
25 He uses classical metaphor to describe the power of the word ‘equality,’ 
likening it to Zeus in the Iliad. ‘πολλάων πολίων κατέλυσε κάρηνα ήδ’ έτι και λύσει τού 
γάρ κράτος έστϊ μέγιστον’, (pollaon polion katelyse karhena ed eti kai lysei tu garh 
krhatus esti megiston, which means ‘he has destroyed the topmost towers of many cities, 
and will do so again, for his is the greatest power’) (Edgeworth 1881, 77; Newman 
2003, 167).
26 For Edgeworth, what seems to be destroyed by ‘equality’ is ‘the crust of 
convention’, and ‘there may be needed an άξία [axia, which means ‘measure’] for the 
unequal distribution’ (Edgeworth 1881, 77 ; Newman 2003, 167). 
The convention Edgeworth refers to here is distinction of class and sex. For example, 
when we think of the existence of classes, the reason the upper classes can receive 
larger remunerations is that they hold the skill and talent for scientific work which 
belong to the superior capacity for pleasure. On the other hand the lower classes should 
be given ‘the work of which they seemed most capable’, i.e. manual work (ibid., 78). 
                                                  
25  Only the case where each individual holds equal capacity for happiness or work 
allows exceptionally the equal distribution of means to become ‘distributive justice’. 
26  It is well known that young Edgeworth read Homer. See Keynes (1933, 266).  - 21  -
Furthermore, the reason women are exempt from harder work is because the stronger, 
which means in general men with larger capacity for work, should do much more 
work.
27 In such conventions, Edgeworth insists, ‘we may see a reason deeper than 
Economics’ (ibid., 78). According to Edgeworth, who noted ‘concerning the 
classification of future society, common sense anticipates no utopia of equality’ (ibid., 
79), ‘the struggle for life’ seems to lead people to such ‘utilitarian selection’. 
Edgeworth calls the utilitarianism explained above ‘exact Utilitarianism’. ‘Exact 
Utilitarianism may also …. present the end of Politics’ (ibid., 80). According to him, ‘a 
political “contract” for the adjustment of conflicting interests should have two 
qualities’: namely, the one which ‘should be clear and fixed, universally interpretable in 
the same sense’ and the other which ‘should be such that the naturally more powerful 
class, those who, though fewer, outweigh the more numerous by strength, ability, and 
capacity to co-operate, should not have reason to think that they would fare better under 
some other contract’ (ibid., 80). When these two qualities are considered, Edgeworth 
states that two kinds of ‘Utilitarianism’ can be adopted, which he called ‘isocratical 
Utilitarianism’ and ‘aristocratical Utilitarianism’, or ‘exact Utilitarianism’. The former, 
which regards ‘equality’ as important, excels in the first quality, and the latter, which 
admits inequality, excels in the second. That Edgeworth put more weight on the second 
quality is clear from the following: ‘the principle “Every man, and every woman, to 
count for one”, should be very cautiously applied’ (ibid., 81). Moreover, he notes that 
‘universal equal suffrage is less likely to be approved than plural votes conferred not 
only (as Mill thought) upon sagacity, but also upon capacity for happiness’ (ibid., 81). 
                                                  
27  However, such considerations should not be due from the stronger to the weaker of 
the same sex. In this case, ‘there is wanting a natural instinct predisposing to the duties 
of benevolence; there has been wanting also a fixed criterion of strength to fix the 
associations of duty; and, lastly, competition has interfered, while competition between 
man and woman has been much less open (and much less obviously useful to the race’ 
(Edgeworth 1881,79).  - 22  -
Thus, when Edgeworth uses the words ‘Utilitarianism’ or ‘Utilitarian’, he implies 
‘exact Utilitarianism’, in other words ‘aristocratical Utilitarianism’; which denies the 
nominal ‘equality’ due to the differences of individual capacities. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Edgeworth’s Mathematical Psychics is a work influenced by various intellectual sources, 
mainly from Sidgwick and Barratt. From the latter half of the 1870s, Edgeworth may 
have been attracted to the ‘Dualism of Practical Reasons’ through the Sidgwick-Barratt 
Controversy. He insisted in New and Old Methods of Ethics, that egoism could be united 
with Utilitarianism through the evolution of moral sentience. However, his idea, at this 
stage, seems to be no more than his expectation, and for the solution to the ‘Dualism of 
Practical Reasons’ it has less persuasiveness. 
  I n  Mathematical Psychics, published four years after his first book, absorbing 
critically Jevons’ exchange theory based on the marginal utility theory, Edgeworth 
developed still more precise discussions. With the ‘Diagram’, he insists that as 
indeterminacy may exist in the contract between egoists, utilitarianism is indispensable 
for its arbitration. However, the range of his contract theory is never confined within the 
framework of Economics. The indeterminacy inherent in transactions in the market was 
a simple substitution for the ‘Dualism of Practical Reasons’. What Edgeworth showed 
was, therefore, a solution to the ‘Dualism of Practical Reasons’ through the explanation 
of the limits of adopting egoism and its need of utilitarianism in the egoistic world. This 
solution was opposite to Sidgwick and Barratt.
28 
    Maintaining the importance of utilitarianism as practical reason, Edgeworth’s point of 
view shifted from the discussion on homogeneous individuals (Economical Calculus) to 
                                                  
28  In fact, he agrees with the opinion that ‘the concrete nineteenth century man is for the 
most part an impure egoist, a mixed utilitarian’ (Edgeworth 1881, 104).  - 23  -
that on the society consisting of heterogeneous individuals (Utilitarian Calculus). From 
this shift of discussion he derived his original utilitarianism. Although Edgeworth had 
admired Sidgwick’s distinction between ‘Egoism’ and ‘Utilitarianism’ (ibid., 102),
29 he 
was not convinced of the utilitarianism of Sidgwick, mentioned in section III. 
Edgeworth’s utilitarianism was much influenced by Barratt’s physical scientific 
methods of ethics, and premised the commensurability of pleasures with an identical 
unit. Since Edgeworth indicated the difference of capacities among individuals, he 
criticized ‘equality’ on the eugenic notion of evolution, which is a mixture of Spencer’s 
evolutionary theory and Galton’s eugenics. For him, ‘unequal distribution of means’ 
based on each capacity was ‘distributive justice’. As shown in the ‘lamps’ parable, if the 
sum of utility reaches maximum, even extremely unequal distributions are admitted.
30 
Thus Edgeworth’s ‘exact Utilitarianism’ was a supplement to Sidgwick’s, and a 
refutation not only of the Benthamites, who suppose complete equality, but also of J.S. 
Mill, who admits the difference of the quality of pleasures. 
  We can see how contemporary economists take these ideas in representative reviews 
by Marshall (1881) and Jevons (1881).
31   Marshall’s review paid attention to 
‘Economical Calculus’, and admired Edgeworth as a ‘genius’; but at the same time 
criticized him for the complexity of the abstract discussion and for too much use of 
                                                  
29  ‘The distinction between egoism and utilitarianism has been drawn with matchless 
skill by Mr. Sidgwick’ (Edgeworth 1881, 102). 
30  Edgeworth, at least, assures that ‘each individual has and shall retain that minimum 
of means just sufficient to bring him up to the zero-point of happiness (a conception 
facilitated by, though not quite identical with, the economical “natural minimum of 
wages”) (Edgeworth 1881, 64). A similar idea can also be found in New and Old 
Methods of Ethics as follows: ‘there is then a “threshold” …. consisting of the 
necessities of life, all that must be pre-supposed before the sentient begins to experience 
pleasure (“satur est quun clamat Horatius ‘Euœ’’’ [‘Horace is well fed when he utters 
the bacchic cry’ (Newman 2003, 253)]). To the necessities of the individual must be 
added his contribution to the necessities of the social state to which he belongs’ 
(Edgeworth 1877, 76). 
31  There is another unsigned review on page 293 in Mind of 1881 (Anon. 1881, 293).  - 24  -
mathematics. In contrast, Jevons, who mainly dealt with ‘Utilitarian Calculus,’ 
applauded the work as ‘a very remarkable one’, but did not completely agree with 
Edgeworth’s argument. This attitude can be seen for example on the division of sex. 
From his own experience in Australia,
32 Jevons criticized Edgeworth as follows: ‘the 
anthropologists have hardly succeeded as yet in reconciling with theory the unfortunate 
position of women in primitive society’ (Jevons 1881, 582). At least, Jevons seems to 
have regarded Edgeworth’s argument on conventions as ‘hierarchy’ rather than strict 
equity in society. 
  Though there are some authors, like Arrow (1994), who understand Edgeworth as one 
who insists on the validity of the hierarchy of social scale as well as that of sex 
difference
33 , the contemporary conventions were not at all other than what 
‘Utilitarianism’ affirms for Edgeworth. 
  In  conclusion,  Edgeworth’s essential ideas in Mathematical Psychics originated in the 
Sidgwick-Barratt Controversy, and absorbed various thoughts from fields such as 
philosophy, psychology and economics via his New and Old Methods of Ethics until it 
finally became the work connecting ethics and economics. Therefore, recent research 
confined within the range of economic theory or history of economic doctrine may only 
permit us to understand Mathematical Psychics partially. This is clear from the fact that 
Edgeworth himself wrote in the recommendation to University College, Liverpool as 
follows: ‘I have written two books, “New and Old [Methods of] Ethics” (published by 
Parker & Co., 1877) and “Mathematical Psychics” (published by Kegan, Paul & Co., 
1881); the former having for its subjects – Morals, and the Logical Methods of the 
Moral Science; the latter treating equally of Moral Philosophy and Political Economy’ 
(MSS Edgeworth D7/13). 
                                                  
32  ‘Among the Australian aborigines, for instance, the husband makes the wife carry all 
the burdens, and knocks her on the head if she declines or flags’ (Jevons 1881, 582). 
33  See Arrow (1994, 94).    - 25  -
To sum up, Edgeworth dealt equally with ‘Utilitarian Ethics’ and ‘Economics’ in 
Mathematical Psychics. This means his Mathematical Psychics can not be brought into 
existence without utilitarianism, even though Schumpeter noted that ‘in his case, as in 
that of Jevons, we can leave out the utilitarianism from any of his economic writings 
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